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Warning Signs From Increases in Non-Performing Loans
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past year, many banks have reported large
increases in the amount of non-performing loans they hold. These
disclosures have sent bank stocks tumbling and raised concerns
about future deterioration in credit quality Increases in non-
performing loans are significant, as changes in the levels of these
loans send important signals about the future health of both the
banking sector and the economy.' Deterioration in credit quality
can lead to tighter lending standards, which reduces credit and can
exacerbate a recession.4 This Note analyzes the impact and
importance of changes in non-performing loans, in particular their
predictive value for the future of the banking sector. Further, the
Note analyzes the current situation in the banking sector and
attempts to give some outlook towards the future of bank credit
quality.
The Note first provides background information on the
accounting for and monitoring of loans in a bank portfolio.' Next,
the Note examines the economics behind changes in non-
performing loans6 and the effect on the banking sector and the
economy.' The Note then reviews the current situation in the
banking sector.8 Finally, the Note provides an analysis of the
impact non-performing loans will have on both the economy and
the banking sector in 2001.'
1. See infra notes 81-105.
2. Banks in Trouble, ECONOMIST, Oct. 28,2000, at 65.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. See infra notes 10-37 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 38-47 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 48-64 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 64-109 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 110-138 and accompanying text.
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II. BASIC INFORMATION ON NON-PERFORMING LOANS
In order to discuss the trends in loan portfolio quality, it is
important to understand the basic terminology, bank
classifications, and accounting practices regarding loan portfolios.
Both accounting rules and internal ratings criteria play important
roles in understanding a bank's loan portfolio."
A. Accounting Treatment
There are four basic terms of bank portfolio accounting.
First, "loan-loss reserves" are the total amount that has been set
aside by the bank for future charge-offs." Generally accepted
accounting principles (GAAP) and regulatory accounting policies
(RAP) require a bank's loan-loss reserves to reflect management's
best estimate of expected future loan losses.'2 Second, "loan-loss
10. Ethan M. Heisler & Jeffrey Frankel, Does Your Bank Have Quality Assets?,
SALOMON SMITH BARNEY U.S. CORPORATE BOND RESEARCH, July 2000, at 29 (on
file with N.C. Banking Inst.).
11. Id.
12. Stephen G. Ryan & Liu Chi-Chun, Differential Valuation Implication Of
Loan Loss Provisions Across Banks And Fiscal Quarters, 72 ACCOUNTING REVIEW,
at 133, 135 (1997). The requirement that loan loss provisions reflect management
expectations of future loan losses makes them largely discretionary. See also The
Allowance for Loan and Lease Losses: Hearing Before the Fin. Inst. and Consumer
Credit Subcomm. of the Comm. on Banking and Fin. Services, 105th Cong. (1999)
(testimony by Emory W. Rushton, Senior Deputy Comptroller for Bank Supervision
Policy) [hereinafter Rushton Testimony]:
A bank's reserve should represent the best estimate its
management can make of how much money the bank will lose on
the loans it has made... Periodically, but not less frequently than
quarterly, each bank must reassess whether the amount remaining
in the reserve is appropriate, given the amount of estimated losses
inherent in its remaining loans.
Id. As a side note, the SEC is currently reviewing a proposal by the American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants that would require banks to only set up a
reserve against potential losses for specific loans that were already in or near default.
Robert A. Bennett, Logical But Dangerous, 110 U.S. BANKER 8 (Aug. 2000). This
proposal is designed to eliminate the ability of banks to "smooth earnings" by
managing their loan loss reserve, increasing it during good earnings quarters and
letting it run down to offset weaker earnings. Id. The SEC argument is that allowing
banks to set reserves qualitatively makes it difficult for investors to understand what
they are getting when they buy bank stocks. Id. Bank regulators and most banks are
arguing against the proposal, stating that reserves are meant to be put aside as a
cushion against future losses-losses that are somewhat predictable as a percentage
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provisions" are increases made to the loan loss reserve." When
bank management determines that the bank does not have
sufficient loan-loss reserves to protect it against future charge-offs,
the loan-loss reserve is increased through a loan-loss provision.'
Third, "non-performing loans" are typically loans which
have not paid interest in over ninety days or are no longer accruing
interest.' Both GAAP and RAP give bank managers some
discretion in determining when to classify a loan as non-
performing.'6 Once a loan is designated as non-performing, a bank
may not continue to accrue the interest due on the loan as
income. The loan is then accounted for under cash-based
accounting principles. Under cash accounting principles, only
interest that is collected is recognized as income." Further, a loan
may not be reclassified as performing until it has paid interest for a
regular period of time, usually a minimum of three cyclesY'
Finally, a "charge-off" describes a reduction in the loan loss
reserve that is made to reflect a loan that is recognized as a loss.2
of a bank's portfolio but are very difficult to predict in advance on an asset by asset
basis. Id. The banks and bank regulators are concerned that a change of this nature
could lead to wildly fluctuating bank earnings, and thus undermine stability in the
banking system. Id.
13. Heisler & Frankel, supra note 10, at 30.
14. Id.
15. Fred Furlong & Simon Kwan, Rising Bank Risk, 99 FED. REs. BANK S.F.
ECONOMIC LETER, 1 (Oct. 22, 1999). Banks can stop accruing interest on loans "for
which payment in full of principal and interest is not expected" or "because of a
deterioration in the financial condition of the borrower." Heisler and Frankel, supra
note 10, at 26 (quoting regulatory report instructions). These allowances give banks
flexibility in determining whether to stop accruing income and classify a loan as non-
performing. Id. In addition, banks can' continue accruing interest on a loan more
than ninety days past due if "the asset is both well secured and in the process of
collection." Id at 27. This discretion makes it difficult to compare two banks'
portfolio quality unless the analyst has some understanding of the credit culture of
each bank. Id.
16. Heisler & Frankel, supra note 10, at 11. Although rules set ninety days of
non-performance as the trigger for classifying a loan as non-performing and using
cash accounting, banks may decide to use an earlier deadline. Id. at 27.
17. Id. at 28.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. A cycle is a payment period specified for a loan. Id. For example, most
loans pay interest quarterly. Id. Generally, the loan must have some period of
normal performance (usually at least three pay cycles) to return the loan to accrual
accounting. Id.
21. Id. at 30.
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If a loan is determined to be uncollectable, it is recorded as a loss
and charged against the bank's loan loss reserve." Gross charge-
offs represent the total amount charged against the reserve in a
period, while net charge-offs reflect the recovery of principal for
any loans that were previously charged against the reserve.3
However, it is important to note that recording a loan as a loss
does not mean that the loan has no value, as banks will typically
recover some portion of the loan amount.24 Over the last few years,
banks have recovered slightly more than twenty-five percent of
gross charge-offs, a number that has dropped significantly in the
last five years.' Although a loan may be charged off directly from
current status, most loans are classified as non-performing for
some period of time before they are charged off the bank's books
as a loss.' Thus, changes in the amount of non-performing loans
are a good indicator of future bank portfolio credit quality, as
increases in the amount of loans classified as non-performing
typically will lead to increases in the amount of future charge-
offs.'
B. Internal Classifications
Additionally, banks and bank examiners have a
classification system for rating loans.' Although classifications can
vary, a loan is either rated pass, special mention, substandard,
22. Id.
23. James M. Wahlen, The Nature of Information in Commercial Bank Loan
Loss Disclosures, 69 AcCr. Rav. 455, 455 (1994). Even though a loan is recognized
as a loss, and charged off the bank's books, banks still can recover some of the value
of the loan through collection of collateral or restructuring. Id. See also Heisler &
Frankel, supra note 10, at 32.
24. Heisler & Frankel, supra note 10, at 44. Many troubled loans are
restructured, and the lender eventually receives some sort of payment from the
borrower. Id. In addition, bank loans are typically a senior position in the credit
structure and are often secured, so the company's assets can be sold to provide some
recovery to lenders. Id.
25. Id. The average recovery percentage for major U.S. bank holding companies
in 1999 was twenty-six percent, down from forty-eight percent in 1994, and thirty-
nine percent in 1995. Id.
26. Id.
27. Wahlen, supra note 23, at 457. Changes in non-performing loans are largely
non-discretionary items and are expected to lead to lower future cash flows. Id.
28. Heisler & Frankel, supra note 10, at 32.
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doubtful, or loss.' A loan is rated as pass if it is considered to be
in sound financial condition with no current or expected
weaknesses that could threaten its ability to be repaid.' A loan
rated "special mention" may have some weakness that could lead
to a deterioration in the future.31 A "substandard" loan is one that
is judged to be inadequately protected by the borrower and that
has a well-defined weakness that jeopardizes the liquidation of the
debt.' A loan is rated "doubtful" if it is highly questionable and
improbable that the loan will be paid back.33 Finally, a loan is
rated as a "loss" when it is no longer considered collectible;
therefore, it must be taken off a bank's books.'
Loans in the special mention, substandard, doubtful and
loss categories are grouped together into a category known as
either criticized or adversely rated assets." Further, loans in the
29. OCC Release 2000-78, Summary of Shared National Credit Program (2000),
at 3 [hereinafter 2000 SNC Results].
30. Id.
31. Heisler & Frankel, supra note 10, at 33. Loans listed for Special Mention
(also known as "Other assets especially mentioned") are "generally considered to be
loans that have potential weaknesses that may, if not checked or corrected, weaken
the asset or inadequately protect the bank's credit position at some future date."
2000 SNC Results, supra note 29, at 3.
32. 2000 SNC Results, supra note 29, at 3.
Substandard-A Substandard asset is inadequately protected by
the current sound worth and paying capacity of the obligor or of
the collateral pledged, if any. Assets so classified must have a well-
defined weakness or weaknesses that jeopardize the liquidation of
the debt. They are characterized by the distinct possibility that the
bank will sustain some loss if the deficiencies are not corrected.
Id.
33. Id. "Doubtful-An asset classified Doubtful has all the weaknesses inherent
in those classified Substandard, with the added characteristic that the weaknesses
make collection or liquidation in full, on the basis of currently known facts,
conditions and values, highly questionable and improbable." Id.
34. Id.
Loss-Assets classified Loss are considered uncollectable and of
such little value that their continuance as bankable assets is not
warranted. This classification does not mean that the asset has
absolutely no recovery or salvage value, but rather that it is not
practical or desirable to defer writing off a basically worthless asset
even though partial recovery may be effected in the fiture.
Id.
35. Heisler and Frankel, supra note 10, at 33.
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last three classifications (substandard, doubtful, and loss) are
defined as classified loans.' Non-performing loans are typically
part of the classified group, with total criticized assets historically
exceeding non-performing assets by approximately three times. 7
III. ECONOMICS OF NON-PERFORMING LOANS
A. Causes
Increases in non-performing loans can be the result of a
variety of factors. Rising interest rates make it difficult for some
borrowers to repay their debts, as incoming cash flows are no
longer enough to cover rising debt payments.' Additionally, an
economic slowdown or an industry specific downturn can make it
difficult for companies and individuals to repay their obligations.39
Today, a more relevant problem is looser credit standards, which
are a significant contributor to deterioration in asset quality.4" As
banks relax their lending standards, they make loans that are less
likely to be repaid.4'
Looser credit standards are often caused by increased
competition in the lending business and by strong periods of
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Andy Gotlieb, Non Performing Loans On The Rise, PHILA. Bus. J., Aug. 11,
2000, at 1.
39. Michael Braga, Bad Loans Sour Banks' Portfolios, TAMPA BAY Bus. J., Dec.
1, 1995, at 1. "Among the domestic and foreign respondents that tightened standards
or terms on C&I loans, a sizable majority of both pointed to a less favorable or more
uncertain economic outlook as an important reason. In addition, about three-
quarters of the foreign banks noted a worsening of industry-specific problems."
August 2000 Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey on Bank Lending Practices, Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve (Aug. 2000), at http://www.federalreserve.gov/
boarddocs/SnLoanSurvey/20008/default.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2001) [hereinafter
August 2000 Survey].
40. Barbara Pinckney, Banks Must Guard Against Loose Lending In Competitive
Market, CAP. DISTRICT Bus. REv., May 3, 1999, at 19 (quoting Julie L. Williams,
Remarks before the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (Oct. 16,
1998), at http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/release/98-104.wpw) (last visited Mar. 3, 2001)
[hereinafter Williams 1998 Remarks]. Williams warned lenders that underwriting
standards have been slipping for the past few years. Id.
41. Beneath That Healthy Exterior, ECONOMIST, July 29,2000, at 45.
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economic growth. 2 As banks face more competition for loans,
they face pressures to lower prices and make loan covenants more
appealing to borrowers. '3 Further, during periods of strong
economic growth, potential borrowers generate cash flows and
growth rates that may not be sustainable during slower economic
periods.' These borrowers may be subjected to less stringent
stress testing and credit analysis than that used during more
difficult economic times.4' Recently, the increased use of the
capital markets by corporations has left banks fighting over less
desirable loan prospects.' In addition, market pressures for
revenue and income growth often result in banks increasing their
overall risk profile in order to increase the size of their loan
portfolio. 7
B. Effects on the Banking Sector and Economy
Increases in the amount of non-performing loans can have
significant effects on bank performance as well as larger impacts
on the economy.' First, increases in non-performing loans usually
spell trouble for future bank earnings.4 9 Non-performing loans
42. Pinckney, supra note 40, at 19 (discussing the reasons for increased
competition in the commercial lending market). Bank lending grew at a far greater
pace than GDP in 1998 and 1999, suggesting that banks were taking on more risk in
their portfolios "in order to generate the fifteen percent or so in earnings-per-share
growth that investors demand". Beneath That Healthy Exterior, supra note 41, at 46.
43. Survey of Credit Underwriting Practices 2000, Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency, (Washington, D.C.), Sept. 2000, at 8 [hereinafter Credit Practice 2000].
Banks have two main ways to improve their competitiveness for loans: improve
(reduce) their price and/or relax their covenants. Id.
44. Pinckney, supra note 40, at 20.
45. Id. Stress testing involves analyzing a borrower's ability to repay a loan
under different economic and/or business circumstances (higher interest rate
environments, lower revenue and earnings growth, slowing economic conditions, etc.)
in order to determine whether the loan will be repaid under less favorable scenarios.
Stephen H. Penman, FINANCIAL STATEMENT ANALYSIS & SECURITY VALUATION 473
(McGraw-Hill Irwin 2001).
46. Beneath That Healthy Exterior, supra note 41, at 47.
47. Id.
48. Pinckney, supra note 40, at 19 (quoting a speech by OCC Chief Counsel Julie
Williams). Ms. Williams stated "the strength of our economy does not depend upon
bankers making bad loans. In fact, poorly underwritten loans are one of the best
ways that I know of to weaken financial institutions and the communities that depend
upon them". Id. See also Williams Remarks 1998, supra note 40.
49. Gotlieb, supra note 38, at 2.
NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE
have multiple effects on bank earnings.' First, banks lose income
from non-performing loans, and this loss directly impacts the
bottom line." The more loans that are non-performing in a bank's
portfolio, the fewer loans that are accruing income." This decrease
in loan income typically results in depressed earnings and poorer
bank performance. '3 In addition, as loans classified as non-
performing do not recover, banks may be forced to write off the
loans as actual losses." Finally, banks typically tighten their
lending standards in response to credit quality concerns and make
fewer loans.5 This tightening of lending standards impacts their
ability to continue to grow revenues and earnings.56 Further,
increases in non-performing loans have the potential to cause a
deterioration in bank asset quality, which can lead to increased
bank failures in extreme cases.'7
In addition to the effect on banks' individual and collective
performance, increases in non-performing loans have a significant
impact on the economy. ' When banks have problems in their
portfolio, they must tighten their underwriting standards and
decrease their lending until the problems are worked out." Thus,
access to credit is reduced for both businesses and individuals,
resulting in lower investment and spending; consequently, the
50. See Beneath That Healthy Exterior, supra note 41. See also Heisler &
Frankel, supra note 10, at 22.
51. Beneath That Healthy Exterior, supra note 41.
52. Id.
53. Id. See also Heisler & Frankel, supra note 10, at 22. Foregone interest at
twenty-five major U.S. bank holding companies in 1999 totaled over $1.1 billion
dollars, which equaled approximately 0.6% of gross interest income. Id.
54. Heisler & Frankel, supra note 10, at 22. Banks have typically averaged about
twenty-five percent recovery rates the last several years. Id.
55. Pinckney, supra note 40, at 19.
56. Id.
57. Rushton testimony, supra note 12, at 1: "Loan losses that exhausted a bank's
reserve, and ultimately wiped out equity capital, have been the primary cause of
almost all bank failures." See also Bemnett, supra note 12, at 8 (discussing New
York's mutual savings banks and reserve policy in the 1970's). During the mid-70's,
banks were "flush with reserves" and pressure was placed on them to reduce
reserves; however, when times worsened, many of the thrifts were driven out of
business and only those with significant reserves survived. Id.
58. See Pinckney, supra note 40, at 20 (looking at bank lending in the first half of
the 1990's). Banks tightened lending standards to clean up deteriorating credit
concerns, worsening the economic recession. Id.
59. Id.
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economy experiences slower growth.' In a worst-case scenario, a
"credit-crunch" is created, resulting in a severe slowdown in
business activity.61 In addition, since increases in non-performing
loans are often the result of business troubles on the part of the
borrower, non-performing loans are often indicative of future
economic slowdowns.2 Increases in non-performing loans are
often viewed as a recessionary signal.' This is partly the result of
decreased lending due to tighter credit standards and partly the
result of weaker performance in the business sector that causes the
initial increase in non-performing loans.'
IV. CURENT SIrUATION
A. Trends
According to national lending surveys, over the past several
years banks have eased their lending standards.' Recently, this
60. Id.
61. Antonio Fins, Souring Loan Portfolios Bode Ill for Economy, S. FLA. SUN-
SENTINEL, Dec. 19, 2000. A severe tightening of lending standards by financial
institutions is viewed by many economists as a significant factor in worsening the
1990-1991 recession. Id. See also Jim Gallagher, Banks are Starting to Worry About
Bad Loans Now That The Economy Is Slowing, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Dec. 17,
2000, HI (highlighting concerns that banks may decrease lending too much and
worsen the current economic situation). In a speech on December 5, 2000, Federal
Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan stated that "[b]oth bankers and their supervisors
should now guard against allowing the pendulum to swing too far the other way by
adopting policy stances the cut off credit to borrowers with credible prospects." Id.
62. See Gotlieb, supra note 38, at 2. Levels of non-performing loans often begin
to rise several quarters before the economy is in recession, as companies in certain
segments of the economy first begin to feel the pinch of a slowdown. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. Due to delays in collecting macroeconomic data, banks maybe aware of
credit quality issues in their portfolios before conclusive evidence of a recession
exists. Id.
65. Pinckney, supra note 40, at 19. See also Credit Practices 2000, supra note 43,
at 8. See also August 2000 Survey, supra note 39. Both surveys showed some
tightening of credit standards in the most recent period, after several years of easing.
See also Julie L. Williams, Remarks before the Robert Morris Associates Lending
and Risk Management Conference (Oct. 5, 1999), at http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/
release/99-90a.doc (last visited Mar. 3, 2001) [hereinafter Williams Remarks 1999]
(commenting on tightening standards for commercial loans for the first time in five
years.) "Easing continues in some important loan markets. And today's
improvements cannot mitigate the overhand of credit risk created by weaker
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trend has slowed and reversed to some extent.6 In the most recent
Federal Reserve Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey on Bank
Lending Practices, banks reported tightening their lending
standards.67 However, the results of these recently eased standards
coupled with a slowing economy have begun to catch up with
many banks.'
In addition, growth in syndicated lending has impacted the
amount of non-performing loans in bank portfolios.69 Syndicated
lending has also resulted in larger loans that are spread across
multiple banks.70 Although most banks claim they utilize the same
credit analysis and underwriting procedures for syndicated loans as
other loans, regulators and some bank analysts have criticized
banks for participating in syndicated loans led by another bank
without putting the loan through as rigorous an underwriting and
credit review process.7 Therefore, the increased number and
dollar volume cause concern for regulators and bank analysts, who
contend that poor underwriting in syndicated loans makes credit
problems more expansive.'
Another trend that causes concern among analysts and
regulators is the rise of committed lines of credit for customers."
standards used in previous years." Id.
66. See August 2000 Survey, supra note 39.
67. Id.
68. Chris Serres, Bad Loans a Growing Problem for Banks, NEWS & OBSERVER,
(Raleigh, N.C.) Oct. 1, 2000 at El (highlighting recent disclosures of problem loans at
Southeastern banks). See also Sara Lacy, Danger Signs Put Focus on Asset Quality,
MEMPHIS Bus. J., July 16, 1999, at 1. See also Laura Mandaro, Loan, Fee Results
Can't Erase Credit Concerns, AM. BANKER, July 19, 2000, at 1 (highlighting quarterly
earnings announcements from several banks and noting the increasing problems with
credit quality apparent in many banks announcements). Most of today's non-
performing loans were made two or three years ago, when loan covenant
requirements were weaker. John Hintze, Increase in Problem Loans Could Impact
Banks, BANK LOAN REP., Dec. 4,2000.
69. Banks in Trouble, supra note 2, at 66. A loan syndication involves two or
more lenders who make a loan to a borrower under a common loan agreement.
Megan Jones, Bankers Beware: The Risks of Syndicated Credits, 3 N.C. BANKING
INST. 169, 173 (1999). Typically, one member of the loan syndicate, who is known as
the lead arranger or book runner of the transaction, will bear the primary
responsibility for structuring and pricing the loan. Id.
70. Serres, supra note 66, at El.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. The Extraordinary Edginess Of The Crowds, ECONOMIST, Jan. 13,2001, at 72.
A committed line of credit is an agreement by a bank to loan money to a client in the
308 [Vol. 5
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Banks often use these lines of credit to help win mandates in
competitive situations.74 At the end of the third quarter, unused
loan commitments were a record $4.3 trillion, half a billion dollars
more than the $3.8 trillion of total outstanding loans.' Lines of
credit expose banks to the risk that a struggling firm, unable to
borrow money in the markets, will draw down their lines of credit,
thereby increasing the bank's exposure to these struggling
companies.76
Finally, an increase in leveraged lending is another trend
that concerns bank analysts and regulators.7 Leveraged lending
has increased markedly at many banks over the last several years.7
Because of the higher debt-to-equity ratio and lower relative cash
flows of leveraged borrowers, leveraged loans are considered
riskier and have higher rates of default than investment grade
credits.79 In a speech before the Lending and Risk Management
Conference in October 1999, Julie Williams, Chief Counsel of the
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency ("OCC") stated that
recent guidance from the OCC on leveraged lending "reflected our
growing concerns with the developing trend toward higher
leverage in lending markets overall. .. [and] our concerns have
future. Id..
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. For example, Xerox drew down approximately $3 billion from lines with
various banks at a time when it would have had extreme difficulty raising money. Id.
77. Banks in Trouble, supra note 2, at 68. Leveraged lending is defined by
regulators as loans where the borrower has debt of three and a half times equity or
more. Id. at 66.
78. Id. at 66. In 1993, seven percent of new syndicated loans were leveraged; in
the first quarter of 2000, that percentage rose to thirty-six percent. Id. Additionally,
the debt-to-equity ratio of non-financial companies rose from seventy-two percent to
eighty-three percent from 1997 to 2000, evidence that banks are lending to companies
that are putting more and more debt on their balance sheet. Id. See also Williams
Remarks 1999, supra note 65.
79. Banks in Trouble, supra note 2, at 70. "Even in the best of times, companies
make mistakes and do poorly. If they're leveraged they're likely to default. The
more leveraged they are, the more likely they'll default." John Hintze, Rise in
Problem Loans May Impact Banks, HIGH YIELD REP., Dec. 4, 2000 (quoting Jeff
Werbalowsky, senior managing director and co-head of restructuring at Houlihan
Lokey Howard & Zukin). Companies do fine with large costs associated with high
debt as long as the economic outlook is good. Sharon Rosenberg, Credit Squeeze,
BROWARD DAILY Bus. REv., Dec. 27, 2000 at Al. However, a slowdown in the
economy could hamper the ability of some local borrowers to- handle large debt loads
and higher interest payments. Id.
309
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particularly escalated about the increasing reliance on so-called
'enterprise values' to justify collateral shortfalls common to many
leveraged financing packages."' Comptroller of the Currency
John Hawke, Jr. echoed those comments again this year in a
statement released with the 2000 Survey of Underwriting
Practices, stating that "we are also apprehensive about the
continued growth of various types of highly-leveraged and sub-
prime lending in the system, and the frequency with which these
activities are being undertaken without adequate analysis and risk
management systems at some banks."'" Regulators are clearly
concerned about the growing volume of leveraged loans and, in
particular, the increasing numbers of them that are considered
criticized.'
B. Recent Results
Since late 1999, there have been several signs that non-
performing loans are increasing and that the increase is due in
large part to increases in syndicated loans and leveraged lending.
Banks first started announcing increases in non-performing loans
in the first and second quarters of 2000.' These problems
generally worsened in the third quarter of 2000, and banks
announced additional bad news in fourth quarter earnings
80. Williams Remarks 1999, supra note 65, at 5.
81. Credit Practices 2000, supra note 43, at 2.
82. Id.
83. See Serres, supra note 66, at El (reporting that eight out of thirteen North
Carolina banks reported increases in non-performing loans in their last earnings
announcement). See also Furlong, supra note 15 ("non-performing loans started to
creep up in recent quarters.") See also Gotlieb, supra note 38 (reporting that as of
March 31,1.38% of all business loans were in trouble, up from 1.27% one year earlier
and 1.15% two years prior).
84. See Seres, supra note 66. In the second quarter of 2000, non-performing loans
as a percentage of total assets increased by eighteen percent at Wachovia Bank,
sending its stock plummeting almost twenty percent in one day. Id. In the same
quarter, non-performing loans were up seven percent at Bank of America, which also
included a $257 million pre-tax reduction in income related to the deterioration of
auto lease residual value in the 3 rd quarter. Id. First Union's non-performing loans
increased from $306 million as of March 31, 1999 to $532 million as of March 31,
2000. Id. See also Mandaro, supra note 66. Comerica Bank reported non-performing
assets increasing by twenty-four percent in the second quarter, KeyCorp Bank,
reported that non-performing assets increased eight and a half percent. Id.
310 [Vol. 5
2001] INCREASES IN NON-PERFORMING LOANS 311
reports.' These increases in non-performing loans forced many
banks to increase their loan-loss reserves or take charges against
the reserve.' In addition, many of these banks cited problems with
syndicated loans as a reason for increasing their reserve.' This
connection would suggest that their credit quality problems could
be more widespread, since other banks are sitting on the same
loans in their portfolioY
Further, the most recent Shared National Credit Review
showed increased cause for concern. Every year, the Federal
Reserve ("Fed"), the OCC and the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation ("FDIC") undertake an annual review of syndicated
loans called the Shared National Credit Program? This annual
review tracks and evaluates all loans over $20 million which have
more than three banks participating.9 For the second straight year
both the dollar volume and the percentage of problem credits
increased.' Adversely rated shared credits have risen from $45
billion in 1998 to $100 billion in 2000, while the percentage of these
85. Mellisa Allison, Bad Loans Have Banks Facing A Difficult Year; Bank Stocks
Already Slipping, CHIC. TRIB., Dec. 26,2000 at Bi. The percentage of banking assets
represented by loans at least ninety days past due increased from 0.6% in the third
quarter of 1999 to 0.7% in the third quarter of 2000, a change which represents
billions of dollars in overdue loans. Id. See also Patrick Reilly, Once Again, Bad
Loans Hurt Profits at Hibernia, AM. BANKER, Dec. 22, 2000, at 1. Hibernia Corp.
announced that its loan-loss provision would be $70 million in the fourth quarter. Id.
See also Carrick Mollenkamp, Bank of America Warns of $1 Billion of Bad Loans,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 7,2000 at A3. Bank of America wrote off $435 million in bad loans
in the third quarter and expects to write off over $1 billion in the fourth quarter. Id.
86. See Seres, supra note 66. In the second quarter of 2000, Wachovia Bank took
a $200 million charge to increase its reserves. Id. See also Marshall, supra note 83.
Bank of America announced it expected to earn between eighty-five and ninety cents
a share in the fourth quarter, down from $1.23 in the prior year. Id. A large portion
of the decline in earnings was due to credit related charges against earnings. Id.
87. Seres, supra note 66.
88. Bad Loans: Is the Situation Likely to Worsen or is There an End in Sight?, 11
HIGH YIELD REP., Aug. 14, 2000, at 5 (discussing Bank of America's net charge-offs
and position in the syndicated lending market). See also The Street.com, which
discusses write-offs in auto leases taken by some banks and the positions in similar
securities held by other banks that have not yet announced any provisions for these
securities. at http://www.thestreet.com-iwon/stocksbanking/1114642.html (last visited
Mar. 2,2001).
89. 2000 SNC Results, supra note 29, at 3.
90. Id. A shared national credit is a loan of more than $20 million shared by
three or more banks. Id.
91. Id.
92. 2000 SNC Results, supra note 29, at 2.
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loans more than doubled from 2.5% in 1998 to over 5% in 2000.93
Even more distressing, the amount of classified loans, the worst of
the adversely rated categories, totaled $63 billion, an increase of
seventy percent from 1999.' 4 In addition, regulators expected the
numbers to increase again in 2001.9' Finally, in its Survey of Credit
Underwriting Practices 2000, the OCC found that the level of
embedded credit risk in banks' portfolios rose for the fifth straight
year.' The survey also indicated that the levels were expected to
increase further in the next twelve monthsY In addition, the OCC
found that fourteen percent of adversely rated loans were to new
borrowers.' "In other words, banks are booking new loans that
are weak at their inception.""
One step several banks have taken recently to clean up
their loan portfolios is to sell packages of troubled loans to
investors.'O The strategy is based on the model regulators used to
clean up and strengthen banks during previous financial system
troubles.' The sale gets the troubled loans off the bank's balance
sheet permanently, which reduces the need for the bank to
93. Id.
94. Banks in Trouble, supra note 2, at 66. In addition, the seventy percent
increase was on top of an over sixty percent increase in 1999. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. Even though banks generally tightened their lending standards in the
most recent survey, "It takes time for risk to work its way through a loan portfolio,"
and the embedded risk from prior years "will not wane based on the modest
tightening done to date." Id.
98 Id.
99. Williams Remarks 1999, supra note 65, at 4.
100. Paul Sherer & Jathon Sapsford, FleetBoston Plays 'Good Bank/Bad Bank,'
Dumps $1.35 Billion in Troubled Loans. WALL ST. J., Jan. 10, 2001, at C1.
FleetBoston sold $1.35 billion in problem loans for $928 million in cash and securities
to Patriarch Partners. Id. Other banks are taking similar steps as well. Id. First
Union moved $719 million in commercial loans to held for sale status, moving them
from the non-performing loan category but leaving them on the bank's books until
they are sold. Heather Timmons, Bad Loans, What Bad Loans? Bus. WK., Nov. 20,
2000, at 158. Once the loans are sold, they are bundled together, insured and sold to
investors in a secondary market. Id. Over $18.5 billion of "distressed" paper traded
in the secondary market in the first three quarters of 2000, compared with only $8.9
billion of all of 1999. Id.
101. Sherer and Sapsford, supra note 98, at C1. Variations of the good bank/bad
bank model were used during financial system crises in Mexico, the United States,
and Asia during the 1980's and 1990's. Id.
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increase its reserve, preventing a drain on the bottom line.102
On January 3, 2001, the Federal Reserve cut interest rates
by one-half of one percent. 3 This surprise move was seen as both
positive and negative news for the financial sector." Lower rates
result in lower cost of funds for banks and make it easier for
borrowers to repay their debts. 5 However, the suddenness of the
Fed's move caused many analysts to wonder if the situation in the
weakening economy is even worse than predicted." The Fed cut
rates by half a percent again on January 31, citing "deteriorating
conditions across the economy"." The two rate cuts in one month
left interest rates in the same position they were in one year
before."° Many analysts believe the Fed will continue to cut rates,
possibly before its next scheduled committee meeting in March,
which would further help banks with credit concerns."°
C. Outlook
Non-performing loans will continue to increase in 2001.10
Several banks have already given guidance that they expect credit
concerns to worsen, at least through the first half of 2001."' In
addition, several bank analysts predict that credit quality will
102. Timmons, supra note 98, at 158. Banks usually sell the loans at a loss, which
is charged against earnings immediately. Id. This allows the banks to cut off the
problem and move forward, instead of having a recurring problem asset on its books
draining revenues each quarter. Id.
103. Greenspan's Big Surprise, ECONOMIST, Jan. 6, 2001, at 15. See also Jacob M.
Schlesinger, Fed's Surprise Move Sparks Market Rally, Sets Off New Jitters, WALL ST.
J., Jan. 4,2001, at Al.
104. Id. The financial markets initially rallied, with the NASDAQ up over 14%
on the day of the announcement, recording its largest percentage increase in one day
in its history. Id.
105. See Sam All, Banks Write Off More Loans as Higher Interest Rates Create
More Bad Debts, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, NJ), Nov. 26, 2000, LEXIS, Market
Library, PROMT File.
106. Greenspan's Big Surprise, supra note 101, at 15.
107. Richard W. Stevenson, Fed Cuts Key Rates By Half A Point, Citing
Slowdown, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31,2001, at Al.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Mark Bruno, Blaming Wall Street, U.S. BANKER, Nov. 2000, at 11. See also
Ali, supra note 103 ("regulators and investors fear this recent spate of bad loan
confessions might mask a far deeper crisis.")
111. Fins, supra note 61.
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continue to deteriorate next year.112 Although most of the
coverage regarding the increases in non-performing loans has been
negative, not everyone thinks the current situation is a harbinger
of future problems.' Some analysts believe that the rising trend in
non-performing loans is peaking and that performance should
improve in the future."' Certainly, the last several years of strong
economic performance have allowed banks to clean up their
portfolios."5 As a result, the large increases in non-performing
loans are driven from a very low beginning base of non-performing
assets."'6 However, as the 2000 Shared National Credit Review and
August 2000 Senior Lending Survey indicate, most banks did not
tighten their underwriting standards until the second half of 2000,
making these analysts' predictions appear overly optimistic.'17
Further, the high level of embedded credit risk in bank portfolios
is expected to increase over the next twelve months, also making
the prospect of additional problem loans more likely."8 Finally,
many analysts are now predicting a slowdown in economic growth
during the first half of 2001, making it increasingly more difficult
for highly leveraged borrowers to generate the cash needed to
repay debt.9
In addition, if problems in syndicated loans continue to
increase, a large number of banks will be affected with loans that
tend to be larger than a bank could extend to a borrower on its
own.1" Eventually, banks with less conservative credit standards
112. Bruno, supra note 106 at 62, 63. Analyst Richard Bove of Raymond James
Financial, Inc expects that because of loan problems, "instead of banks growing
earnings at ten percent to twelve percent they are going to grow at one percent to
two percent." Barbara Etzel, Bad Loans, Junk Woes Turn Tide Against The Street,
INvESTMENT DEALERS DIGEST, Nov. 16, 2000, at 4. Goldman Sachs analyst Lori
Applebaum expects problem loans to grow at an average of twelve percent at twelve
of the banks she covers. Hintze, supra note 66.
113. Bad Loans, supra note 108, at 5.
114. Id.
115. Heisler & Frankel, supra note 10, at 5.
116. Id. at 4.
117. See 2000 SNC Results, supra note 29.
118. Credit Practices 2000, supra note 43.
119. Constance Mitchell Ford, Economic Growth is Expected to Slow to a Crawl in
2001, WALL ST. J., Jan. 2, 2001, at A2. Most economists don't expect a full-blown
recession this year, but nearly all of them warn that the risk of recession is
substantially higher this year than it has been in many years. Id.
120. Heisler & Frankel, supra note 10, at 11. The default rate for syndicated loans
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will have to account for the loans against which more conservative
banks have already taken reserves. 1' As discussed earlier, bank
management has some leeway in determining when to categorize a
loan as non-performing; consequently, different banks holding a
portion of the same loan may have it classified differently."
However, if the loan continues to deteriorate, all banks will have
to declare it non-performing."
One probable result of an increasing number of problem
loans is a tighter lending environment.' As the results of the
August 2000 Senior Lending Officer survey indicate, this tighter
credit environment is already beginning to materialize, as more
banks tightened their lending standards than eased them for the
second straight time, pointing largely to both worsening economic
conditions as well as reduced tolerance for risk as significant
factors in their decision." As previously discussed, tighter lending
criteria are also a typical result of credit quality deterioration, as
banks tighten standards in order to clean up their books and
restore their portfolio credit quality."
Increases in problem loans and the resulting decreases in
bank lending will continue to have a negative impact on bank
earnings and revenue growth.127 Several banks have already given
negative guidance for 2001, and many analysts are predicting very
small or flat earnings growth for 2001, based largely on charges
due to problem loans." In addition, banks will continue to sell
'bad loans in order to move them off their books, taking an
immediate write-down rather than having the loan continue to be
rose to 5.1% from a record low of 2.5% in 1998. Holed, ECONOMIST, Nov. 11, 2000,
at 96. See also Hintze, supra note 66.
121. Heisler & Frankel, supra note 10, at 11.
122. Id. at 6.
123. Id.
124. August 2000 Survey, supra note 39.
125. Id.
126. Pinckney, supra note 40, at 20.
127. See supra notes 48-57 and accompanying text.
128. Etzel, supra note 108. In a presentation to investors, Bank of America Chief
Financial Officer Jim Hance stated "We're pessimistic about the economy, we're
pessimistic about the capital markets and the ability of companies to refinance, and
it's very easy for companies to throw in the towel. We're taking a very conservative
outlook." Ina Cordle, Bad Loans Vex Bank of America, MIAMI HERALD, Dec. 12,
2000, LEXIS, Market Library, PROMT File.
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a drag on their earnings.129
On a larger scale, tighter lending criteria by banks could
accelerate a slowdown in the economy.1" Tighter lending
standards make it harder for companies to get loans, as companies
that would qualify for loans in a looser lending environment either
no longer meet lending criteria, or have their borrowing amounts
decreased.13' This in turn leads to decreased business investment
and can lead to a worsening of already weakening economic
conditions.m There are already a number of analysts concerned
about an impending credit crunch. 3 If the economy continues to
slow and banks continue to reduce their lending, the Federal
Reserve will need to continue to reduce interest rates in order to
introduce additional liquidity into the economy."
Finally, if credit concerns worsen more significantly at
some banks than others, a new wave of bank consolidation could
also result.135 Recently, FleetBoston Financial Corp. announced it
expected to have between four and five billion dollars in excess
capital by the end of 2001, fueling speculation of potential
acquisitions."
129. See supra notes 100-102 and accompanying text.
130. Pinckney, supra note 40, at 20. In a credit crunch, banks cut back on loans,
good companies can't borrow money, and economic growth stalls. Gallagher, supra
note 61.
131. Jeff Harrington, Banks Warn Businesses Credit Will Be More Difficult to
Obtain, ST. PETERSBURG TIMEs, Dec. 13,2000.
132. Pinckney, supra note 40, at 20.
133. The Clenching of U.S. Credit Markets, Bus. WK., Dec. 4, 2000, at 182. In an
editorial, Business Week warned "Add it all up, and a nascent credit crunch is
increasing the chances of a hard landing for the economy." Id. Due to the six to
twelve month time lag for changes in monetary policy to affect the economy,
Business Week expressed concern that if the Fed waits too long to act, "the
momentum for a hard landing could become unstoppable." Id.
134. Id.
135. John Hechlinger & Carrick Mollenkamp, FleetBoston May Look South to
First Union, WALL ST. J., Jan. 18,2001 at C1.
136. Tim McLaughlin, FleetBoston Considers Acquisitions, REUTERS NEWS
SERVICE, Jan. 18, 2001. FleetBoston CFO Eugene McQuade denied reports of an
impending merger bid for First Union but said that Fleet would be looking
aggressively for acquisitions. Tim McLaughlin, FleetBoston To Have 'Boatload of
Capital,' REUTERS NEws SERVICE, Jan. 18, 2001. McQuade said "this is actually a
time where we think there will be a lot of opportunities as companies begin to feel
pressure, whether it be budget pressure, credit quality pressure.. .We think there will
be a lot of opportunities and the bidding won't be so great." Id.
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V. CONCLUSION
Non-performing loans are clearly an important factor in
banking sector performance and they are also a very useful tool to
help predict the direction of bank portfolio quality, performance,
and earnings. More importantly, non-performing loan data
provides helpful insights into the larger economy as well, giving
early signs of an economic slowdown or other problems in the
private sector. As an example, warnings about increases in non-
performing loans began to surface in the first quarter of 2000, long
before the rest of the country became focused on a potential
slowdown in the economy.137
Clearly, after many years of strong loan portfolio
performance, recent increases in non-performing loans point to a
decline in credit quality within the banking sector." In particular,
the large increases in criticized assets by the Shared National
Credit Review point to potentially serious trouble if interest rates
rise or the economy continues to slow.
JOHN MURCHISON
137. See supra notes 83-99 and accompanying text. Concerns about a recession did
not generate much publicity until late fall and became most prevalent in December of
2000. See Dina Temple-Raston, Specter of U.S. Recession rises from Mid-east, Euro
Turmoil, USA TODAY, Oct. 16, 2000, at lB. In October, several analysts increased
their forecasted probability of a recession, and the stock markets tumbled as interest
rates and energy prices increased. Id.; see also Patricia Hill, Greenspan Warns
Plunging Markets a Recession Threat; Fed Chief Hints Lower Rates Will Help Wall
Street, WASH. Tmms, Dec. 6, 2000, at Al. Chairman Greenspan acknowledged the
threat of a recession for the first time, while "private economists ... increasingly
warned of a heightened risk in recent days." Id. See also Floyd Norris, Speaking of
Recession, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2000, at D2.
138. See supra notes 83-99 and accompanying text.
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